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We adopt a multi-theoretic approach to investigate a previously unexplored phenomenon in
extant literature, namely the differential impact of ownership identity and director dominate
shareholding on the performance of emerging market firms. The main research question addressed is,
whether the impact of this relationship is conditional on the identity of the block investor. First, the
relationship between overall block ownership and firm performance is tested by employing multiple
regressions on 500 firm-year observations for the period from 2007 to 2011. Then, the block
ownership is classified as the state, individuals, insiders, financial institutions, corporate and foreign
investors and the influence of these identities on firm performance is examined. It was found that only
the ownership categories such as the government, institutions and foreign ownership have positive
influence on the firm performance. The results also indicate that high level of insider ownership also
negatively associated with the firm performance. The main contribution of this paper is the
examination of the relationship between block ownership and firm performance from the perspective
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1. Introduction
The corporate governance literature classifies
ownership identity as an influential internal
governance mechanism (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Agency theory highlights that principals and agents
often have conflicting goals and capacities to
influence corporate behaviour and outcomes
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). An important
contribution of agency theory is that it facilitates a
structured approach to the analysis of economic
motivations and the incentives of managers and
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, agency
theory has been criticized in the sociology literature
for its failure to pay sufficient attention to the context
in which exchange and principal-agent relations are
embedded (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988).
Studies that investigated ownership structure and
performance relationship focused only on the
conventional separation of ownership and control
concept, in reality there are many different types of
ownership in existence, for example, institutional
investors, corporate investors, government investors,
individual investors, insider ownership (Boone et al.,
2011). These ownership types have different

behavioral characteristics which provide them with
different levels of involvement in companies.
The increased volatility of corporate ownership
portfolios observed in recent years has led to renewed
interest in ownership structures, especially with
respect to multinational enterprises. As the economies
of the world become more and more globally
integrated, such issues will become more prominent
and will affect our understanding of the interweaving
systems of corporate relations, through which formal
and informal networks of power are established
(Heubischl, 2006 and Pfeffer, 1972). They can be
understood as a potential source for inter-corporate
power and coordination leading to corporate control.
We investigate this issue by analyzing a sample
of KSE-100 indexed Pakistani companies where
outside block ownership is common but does not
necessarily reside with one category of investors. The
argument advanced in this study is that the
blockholders represent different segments of investors
in the market (corporate, individuals, institutions,
state, foreign and director ownership) and therefore,
their incentives to monitor managers can vary from
one group to another. In a non-homogenous block
ownership environment, it is important to account for
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these differential influences in order to arrive at a
conclusion about the relationship between ownership
identity and firm performance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows:
Section II reviews the relevant literature on ownership
identity and performance relationship. Section III
provides Hypotheses development and IV description
about Pakistani environment while Section V
describes the data collection procedure and analytical
methodology employed. This is followed by the
discussion of empirical findings in Section VI. The
last section offers some conclusions on the topic.
2. Literature Review
a) Ownership Identity
According to Zeitun & Gary (2007), ownership
structure depends on a country’s social, political,
economic and cultural norms. In an emerging market
like Pakistan, these factors are likely to be entirely
different from those of developed countries, which
may limit the application of empirical models tested
in mature markets.
There is substantial empirical literature on the
impact of ownership structure on the financial
efficiency of firms (Morck et al., 2000; Anderson &
Reeb, 2003; Burkart et al, 2003; Caselli & Gennaioli,
2003; Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Villalonga
& Amit, 2006; Balsmeyer & Czarnitzki, 2010; and
Bozec et al, 2010). The findings, however, are not
conclusive and the spectrum of results is quite wide.
Thus, for US firms the analysis by Demsetz and
Villalonga (2001) and Holderness (2003) revealed no
relationship between ownership structure and
performance. Studies conducted by Claessens &
Djankov, (1999); Gorton & Schmid, (2000); Sarkar &
Sarkar (2000); Sun & Tong, (2003) and Lee, (2008)
report that the financial performance of a firm is
positively influenced by the level of ownership
structure. While Franks & Mayer (2001) find a higher
turnover of directors in closely held firms in
comparison to their widely held counterparts,
investigations conducted by Kaplan & Minton (1994)
and Kang & Shivdasani (1995) reveal that firms with
block shareholdings are more likely to replace
managers or to restructure their firms following a
period of underperformance. Additionally, the
presence of large shareholders increases the
susceptibility of a firm to and probability of a
takeover thereby proving managers with incentives to
generate attractive returns to shareholders (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986 and Shivdasani, 1993).
Many empirical studies that have investigated
the relationship between block ownership and firm
performance have analyzed either the overall level of
block ownership (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz,
and Villalonga, 2001) or just inside block ownership
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990;
Craswell et al., 1997; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Short

and Keasey, 1999) or block ownership samples
gathered in unique microstructure settings such as
bank block ownership in the bank centered economies
of Japan and Germany (Morck, et al. 2000; Gorton
and Schmid 2000), state non-tradable block
ownership in China (Qi et al., 2000; Sun & Tong,
2003; Wei et al., 2005; Gunasekarage et al., 2007)
and, institutional and foreign block ownership in
privatized firms (Claessens & Djankov, 1999). The
findings reported in these studies are inconclusive.
b) Director Domination Ownership
Agency theory argued that dominating director
ownership implies better incentives to monitor,
greater incentive alignment, undeviating partaking
and therefore higher expected profits and share prices
(Larner, 1971; McEachern, 1975; Herman, 1981 and
Sorenson, 1996). But higher insider ownership may
also imply greater managerial entrenchment,
diversion of funds and thereby leads to lower
efficiency (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck et al,
1988; Gugler, 1999; and Dyck & Zingales, 2004).
A large number of empirical researches
scrutinize the relationship between insider dominating
shareholding and firm performance in developed
countries which based on “single equation models”
generally found a positive or perhaps insignificant
relationship between insider ownership and
performance (Short 1994), While non-linear
relationships between managerial ownership and
market valuation (e.g. Morck et al. 1988, McConnell
and Servaes, 1990, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000).
But, as mentioned, more recent simultaneous
estimations of the “causes and consequences” of
insider ownership have found insignificant
performance effects (Loderer & Martin 1997; and
Himmelberg et al, 1999).
Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu (2008) stated that in
the US, firm performance initially rose with an
increase in the insider ownership but fell when the
insider ownership exceeded 60 percent of the
companies. Loderer & Martin (1997) used the sample
of 867 US companies found a weak bowl-shaped
effect of director ownership on both measures
estimated by simple regression. Therefore, research
interpret these results as evidence that managers have
inside knowledge and increase their shareholdings
prior to good acquisitions whereas high share prices
and Q-values induce them to sell out.
Cho (1998) examines investment as an
intermediate variable between director ownership and
performance measured by Q-values of 326 Fortune
500 firms in 1991. He found that Q-values have a
positive impact on dominating director ownership and
that director ownership has a significant nonmonotonous effect on investment, which again has a
positive impact on Q-values. When taking this into
account in a 3-equation model simultaneously
determining director ownership, Q-values and
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investment, the non-monotonous effect of ownership
structure on Q-values becomes insignificant.
However, previous research found a positive
association between low levels of insider ownership
and performance (Kim, Lee, & Francis, 1988;
Mehran, 1995; Hossain, Prevost, & Rao, 2001;
Elayan, Lau, & Meyer, 2003; Welch, 2003). On the
other side, researchers report the relationship between
dominating director ownership and firm performance
is non-monotonic (Chen et al., 1993; Griffith, 1999;
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999), supporting
convergence-of-interest hypothesis at some low levels
of insider ownership and an entrenchment hypothesis
at higher levels of director ownership which indicate
non-linear relationship between ownership and
performance. However, stewardship theorist claims
that there is no relationship between insider
ownership and performance (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz
& Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
3. Hypotheses Development
The standard assumption is that each of the ownership
categories has different objective with implications
for corporate strategy and performance (Edwards &
Nibler, 2000; Morck et al., 2000 and Thomsen &
Pedersen, 2000). Thomsen & Pedersen (2002) argue
that the identity of large owners e.g. family, bank,
institutional investors, government, and other
companies has important implications for corporate
strategy and performance. Evidence suggests that
blockholder identity may matter because shareholders
can have heterogeneous incentives and capacities to
monitor managers (Gedajlovic, 1993 and Thomsen &
Pederson, 2000).
a) Associate Company Shareholding
In corporate shareholding or associated company
shareholding is that where the shares are held by one
company in another. Business groups are also one of
the major ownership categories that also called
associated company ownership or family ownership.
Business groups consist of a collection of firms,
which are linked together by common ownership, and
director interlocks. Group affiliation has both benefits
and costs. Among the beneficial effects, Chang and
Hong (2000) find that group companies serve as an
organizational structure for appropriating quasi rents,
which accrue from access to scarce and imperfectly
marketed inputs such as capital and information.
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) defined Business group as
a set of firms which, though legally independent are
bound together by a group of formal and informal ties
and are accustomed to taking coordinated action.
However, groups are also associated with the larger
possibility of (i) inefficient transfer of resources from
more profitable firms to financially constrained firms
(Shin and Park, 1999) and (ii) exploitation of minority

shareholders by means of tunneling of resources
through pyramids and extensive crossholdings by the
controlling family (Johnson et al., 2000, and Bertrand
et al., 2002).
Alchain (1969) argued that group business create
the internal capital market facility. Scharfstein &
Stein (1994) extended the Alchain argument by
comparing the financing arrangement with-in the
group and financing through bank (in case bank is not
a group member). They argued that group headquarter
is better able to monitor and access to information
regarding member company than bank. Where capital
market is underdeveloped, business groups facilitate
capital allocation among group members (Perotti &
Gelfer, 2001). Hoshi (1991), and Kim &
Limpaphayom, (1998), in their studies found that
Japanese keiretsu structure of companies had close
relationship with their main bank and this relationship
played a significant role in reducing the costs of
financial distress. Kester (1986); Berglof & Perotti
(1994) argued that keiretsu structure also reduces the
informational asymmetries between creditors and
shareholders.
Hypothesis H1a: There is a positive relationship
between the higher proportion of corporate
ownership and profitability among Pakistani firms.
b) Directors’ Shareholding
The classical publication of Adam Smith (1776: 700)
have suggested that “negligence and profusion,
therefore, must have prevail” in management
controlled companies because it cannot be expected
that those who mange others’ money will watch over
it with the same “anxious vigilance” as they would
watch over their own. Meanwhile, Jensen & Meckling
(1976) and Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that insider
ownership can cause two types of fully differentiated
behaviour: convergence of interests with shareholders
and the entrenchment effect.
McKnight & Weir (2009) found that higher
managerial ownership reduces company agency costs,
supporting the earlier findings of Coles, Lemmon and
Mescke (2005). This may be because higher personal
shareholding by directors bonds them to the company
and acts as a method for mitigating agency costs in
listed companies. Studies by Ang, Cole & Lin, (2000)
and Singh & Davidson (2003) validate that higher
director ownership reduces the misalignment between
shareholders and managers and lowers agency costs.
However, an optimal level of insider ownership is
determined by firm size, industry, investor protection
level, and performance of the firm (Hu & Izumida,
2008).
Previous studies find mixed results for director
ownership and its effects on the firm value and
performance. Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz & Lehn
(1985) argue that insider ownership and company
financial value have endogenous effects and that there
should be no systematic relationship. However,
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controlling the endogenous effect of insider
ownership and company financial performance,
Bohren and Odegaard (2001) find a positive
relationship between insider ownership and company
value in the Norwegian context.
In a review of a number of these studies;
Hypothesis H1b: There is a positive relationship
between the higher proportion of insider’s ownership
and profitability among Pakistani firms.
c) Individual Public Shareholding
In many emerging countries, public ownership is
among the largest group of blockholders (Claessens et
al., 2000). Sun & Tong (2003) reported that public
ownership has positive impact on firm performance
after share issue privatization, using listed firms’ data
during the period 1994-2000. Delios & Wu (2005)
reported a U-pattern relationship between individual
public ownership and Tobin’s Q using the data of
public firms listed on China’s two stock exchanges
during 1991-2001. In a review of a number of these
studies:
Hypothesis H1c: There is a positive relationship
between the higher public shareholding and
profitability among Pakistani firms.

industry leads to an improvement in the productivity.
Chibber & Majumdar, (1999) find that the extent of a
foreign firm’s control over a domestic firm is
positively associated with the degree of resource
commitment to technology transfer. Djankov &
Hoekman (2000) find foreign investment is directly
associated with the provision of generic knowledge
and specific knowledge. Goethals & Ooghe (1997) in
their study of Belgium (held on 50 foreign and 25
local companies) concluded that foreign companies
have a better financial performance compared to
domestic companies. Among emerging economies,
Willmore (1986) analyzing a matched sample of
foreign and domestic firms in Brazil and finds
foreign firms to have higher ratios of value-added
to output, higher labor productivity and greater
capital intensity among others. However, from
Thailand Wiwattanakantang (2001) found that foreign
controlled firms exhibit superior performance.
As a consequence, we expect to find a positive
relationship between the foreign ownership and firm
performance of Pakistani corporations:
Hypothesis H1d: There is a positive relationship
between the higher proportion of foreign ownership
and profitability among Pakistani firms.
e) State Shareholding

d) Foreign Shareholders
It is important to disentangle the effects of foreign
ownership in a firm belonging to foreign industrial
corporations and foreign financial institutions.
Agency theory suggests that since foreign corporate
ownership stakes are larger and less fragmented than
stakes held by foreign institutional shareholders, the
incentives of these larger shareholders are more
aligned to perform an effective monitoring role. Gorg
& Greenaway (2004) argue that the main challenging
question in the international business strategy is the
outcome gained from foreign ownership of firms. It is
mainly accepted that foreign ownership plays a
crucial role in firm performance, particularly in
developing and transitional economies. There are
important governance implications for firms with and
without foreign holdings which ultimately have a
bearing on the performance of firms. These
performance differences arise from the possession of
certain firm specific advantages that accrue to the firm
with foreign ownership. These firm specific
advantages stem from advanced technological knowhow, marketing and managing skills, export contacts,
coordinated relationships with suppliers and
customers and reputation (Aitken & Harrison, 1999).
Empirical studies found evidence supporting
such a conjecture. For instance, Boardman, Shapiro &
Vining (1997) find significant performance
differences among multinational enterprises or their
subsidiaries and domestic firms in Canada. Harris &
Robinson (2003) report that presence of foreign
owners in companies in the UK manufacturing

The government shares are held by the federal and
provincial State. State ownership is an involvement
ownership type because governments have power not
only from the corporate legal property right point of
view, but from state policy setting, implementation
and reputation.
De Alessi (1980 & 1982) defines state-owned
enterprises as ‘political’ firms with general public as a
collective owner. A specific characteristic of these
firms is that individual citizens have no direct claim
on their residual income and are not able to transfer
their ownership rights. Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny
(1996) argue that in most cases the agency problem in
government owned companies arises from political
issues rather than managerial issues.
However, Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny (1996)
argue that in most cases the agency problem in
government owned companies arises from political
issues rather than managerial issues. The conflict of
interest between government and other owners often
arises because the State is more interested in political
outcomes compared to the other owners who are more
interested in the financial returns. Gursoy & Aydogan
(2002) found that when compared to the familyowned companies, government-owned companies
have lower accounting-based returns but higher
market-based returns in Turkish listed companies.
Sun, Tong & Tong (2002) report that the relationship
between government owners and Chinese companies’
performance follow an inverted U-shape pattern.
Accordingly, we propose the following
hypotheses:
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Hypothesis H1e: There is a positive relationship
between the higher proportion of state ownership and
profitability among Pakistani firms.
f) Institutional Shareholding
The role of financial institutions on the theoretical
literature of ownership identity has been crucial
pragmatic as anti-takeover barriers (Sheard, 1991).
Meanwhile, Gedajlovic & Shapiro (2002) argue that
these financial institutions are well positioned to
monitor the executives of the firms within their
network. Heaw-Wellalage & Locke (2011) stated
from Sri Lanka that institutional ownership is
predominant and approximately 95% of multinational
subsidiaries are owned and operated by institutional
investors and performed betters as compare to
domestic companies. Hayashi (2003) found that
institutional ownership was responsible for 60% of all
outstanding equity in US, compared to 8% in 1950.
As a result of the growing volume of equity controlled
by institutional owners, the role of institutional
investors has changed from passive investors to active
monitors. Meanwhile, Chirinko et al. (1999) explain
that financial institutions might be important mainly
because of their role as supplier of debt but also as
equity holder and their representation on supervisory
board. Jensen (1989) argues that joint ownership of
debt and equity by large informed investors results in
stringent managerial monitoring and create strong
incentive for managers to make value maximizing
decisions. Cornett et al. (2007) explain institutional
shareholders have more opportunity, resources and
ability to monitor and influence managers.
Institutional shares are held by investment bank,
insurance companies, mutual fund companies and/or
other investment institutions. Nickel, Nicolitsas &
Dryden (1997) did not found the effect of dominant
external shareholders on company performance,
except when the dominant external shareholder is a
financial institution. Chaganti & Damanpour (1991)
investigated the effect of institutional investors that
presence of higher proportion of institutional investor
leads to relatively higher performance. Xu and Wang
(1997) found positive and significant correlation
between profitability and large institutional
shareholders in China.
Navissi & Naiker (2006) find institutional
owners have greater incentive to monitor management
in New Zealand context, and it positively affects
firms’ financial performance. This may be due to fact
that unlike boards of directors, institutional investors
have increasingly used their power to pressure
managers to come into line with the shareholders’
interests (Cornett et al., 2007). Moreover, higher
institutional ownership is always associated with
higher board remuneration and incentive-related
executive compensation, and it reduces the likelihood
of CEO duality on the board (Henry, 2010). Gürbüz,
Aybars & Kutlu (2010) analyze 164 firms from

Turkey and demonstrate a positive relationship
between corporate governance and institutional
ownership on firm financial performance. Clay (2001)
finds a significant positive relationship between
company performance and institutional ownership
percentage in US, where a 1% increase in institutional
ownership leads to 0.75% increase in company
financial performance. Similar results were found by
Lin (2010) who posits that when the institutional
ownership is higher than 81.2% in Taiwanese
companies, firm values start to increase.
Hartzell & Starks (2003) find that institutional
ownership mitigates agency costs between
shareholders and managers, because it increases the
monitoring. In line with the above findings, using
firms from the North American casino industry, Tasi
& Gu (2007) posit a negative agency costs
relationship between institutional ownership and
agency costs. However, Henry (2010) employed
Australian listed companies’ data and found negative
results. In a review of a number of these studies:
Hypothesis H1f: There is a positive relationship
between the higher proportion of Institutional
ownership and profitability among Pakistani firms.
g) Others’ Categories of Shareholding
Other categories of the shareholding consist of public
companies, charitable and other trusts, NGOs,
Cooperative societies, etc. Literature is considerably
thin about this class of ownership and need to
research on it seriously. These blockholders usually
have a long investment horizon. Allen and Philips
(2000) present evidence that supports the argument
that corporate ownership provides significant benefits
to firms involved in certain business agreements by
reducing the costs of monitoring the alliances or
ventures between firms.
Hypothesis H1g: There is a positive relationship
between the higher proportion of ‘others categories’
of ownership and profitability among Pakistani firms.
4. Corporate Landscape in Pakistan
The ownership structure of companies in Pakistan
together with other governance mechanisms makes an
investigation of block ownership in this country
interesting. First, being an emerging economy with a
relatively inactive market for corporate control,
Pakistan investors can be expected to rely on internal
governance mechanisms such as block ownership to
minimize agency conflict and to generate a return for
their investment. Second, and in relation to the first
point, corporate ownership in Pakistan is
characterized by a strikingly high level of
concentrated ownership; this has remained unchanged
for a long period of time.
There are considerable differences in corporate
governance frameworks and practices between
Pakistan and most developing economies. Pakistan is
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a common law country having one tier board structure
and the majority of large public companies display
concentrated ownership structures with strong family
ownership or associate companies. As a result, the
Pakistani corporate environment is characterized by
power asymmetries among controlling shareholders,
minority shareholders and management, in favor of
the first. In order to improve the corporate governance
environment in Pakistan, an array of institutional and
government initiatives have been implemented from
last decade. Institutional investors, National
Investment Trust (NIT), Investment Corporation of
Pakistan (ICP), have increased their participation as
minority shareholders of large public companies and
currently play an important role in developing local
corporate governance practices.
Securities and Exchange Commission of
Pakistan (SECP) is the principal regulator of
securities market and non-bank companies, including
non-listed companies. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)
regulates Commercial Banks & Non-Banking
Financial Institutions with prudential regulations.
Since its establishment, it has initiated a number of
reforms aimed at improving corporate governance
policies, structures and frameworks in Pakistan. The
most important reform was the implementation of the
code of Corporate Governance in March, 2002 and
revised in May, 2012.
Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance
(PICG) playing a pivotal role in conjoining SBP and
seventeen other associations that were all concerned
with corporate governance. PICG is today a hybrid
Institute of Governance and Institute of Directors. As
the Institute of Governance, it increases awareness
and champion the cause of good governance practices
and, as the Institute of Directors, it develops
professionalism and encourages engagement of
corporate bodies and individuals in the role of
effective oversight. PICG providing knowledge about
best practices in corporate governance to all key
stakeholders affected by corporate governance by
improving the quality of corporate governance in
Pakistan.
5. Methodology
In line with prior studies that examine the relationship
between ownership and firm performance (Gedajlovic
and Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000;
Khanna and Palepu, 2000), this research uses the
following regression specification:
Performance = f (ownership variables, control
variables)
a)

Data Collection

Our sample comprised KSE – 100 index companies
for five years 2007 to 2011. Companies were
excluded in case of non availability of data and/or
missing data. According to the Karachi Stock

Exchange official brochure (Published in 2012) “The
KSE-100 Index was introduced in November 1991
with base value of 1,000 points. The KSE - 100 Index
comprises of 100 companies selected on the basis of
sector
representation
and
highest
market
capitalization, which captures over 90% of the total
market capitalization of the companies listed on the
Exchange. Out of the following 33 Sectors, 32
companies are selected i.e. one company from each
sector (excluding Open-End Mutual Fund Sector) on
the basis of the largest market capitalization and the
remaining 66 companies are selected on the basis of
largest market capitalization in descending order. This
is a total return index i.e. dividend, bonus and rights
are adjusted.” (p. 7)
Data on required variables is collected through
secondary sources. Data on Corporate Governance
internal mechanism are collected through company
information page, compliance with the code of
corporate governance report, directors’ profiles and
directors’ report to the shareholders. Data related to
financial part of the study is collected from financial
statement part of Annual Reports.
b) Reliability Analysis
Reliability analysis was used to assess internal
consistency (degree of homogeneity among the
items). Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients were computed
and the overall assessment was 0.87. According to
Nunnally (1978), a data collection instrument with a
good internal consistency should have Cronbach’s
Alpha coefficients that are higher than 0.7. The items
were therefore, found to be highly homogeneous.
Variables
The variables employed in our equations are
described in Table 1.

a) Performance Variable
The concept of enterprise performance allows many
interpretations. In applied studies it is common to
associate improvements in firm performance with
increased profitability, higher efficiency, and
increased output (Bevan et al., 1999).
Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) divided the
measures according to the time perspectives and the
measuring identity: the accounting profit is backwardlooking and are calculated by accountants under the
constraints of standards; Tobin’s q, on the other hand,
is forward-looking and are caught by the community
of investors under the constraints of markets.
The variables employed in this study for firm
profitability were ROE (return on equity), ROA
(return on assets), Tobin’s Q (Q) and EVA (Economic
Value Added).
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Table 1. Description of variables
Ownership Identity Variables
( Corporate Ownership (O_COR)

Percentage of associated company ownership in a company to the total equity.

B Individual Ownership (O_IND)

Percentage of Individual Public ownership in a company to the total equity.

( Director Ownership (O_DIR)

Percentage of Company Directors ownership in a company to the total equity.

( Institutional Ownership (O_INS)
( Foreign Ownership (O_FOR)

Percentage of Institutional investor’s ownership in a company to the total
equity.
Percentage of foreign investor’s ownership in a company to the total equity.

( State Ownership (O_STA)

Percentage of Government ownership in a company to the total equity.

( Other’s Ownership (O_OTH)

Percentage of ownership other than above said types in a company to the total
equity.
Companies having more than 51% executive director’s domination.

A
)
C)
D)
E)
F)
G)
( Director Domination (D_DOM)
H)
Performance Variable
( Return on Equity (ROE)
I)
( Return on Assets (ROA)
J)
( Tobin Q (Q)
K)
( Economic Value Added (EVA)
L)

Control Variables
( Financial Leverage (FL)
M)
( Firm Size (F_SIZE)
N)
( Firm Age (F_AGE)
O)

Net Profit divided by Total Equity (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Gugler &
Yurtoglu, 2003 and Bjuggren & Wiberg, 2008)
Net Profit divided by Total Assets (Barber & Lyon, 1996; Core, Guay &
Rusticus, 2006 and Bhagat & Bolton, 2010)
The ratio between the market value and replacement value of the same
physical asset (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003;
Bjuggren & Wiberg, 2008)
Net Operating Profit After Taxation (NOPAT)
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
Invested Capital (IC)
EVA = NOPAT – (WACC x IC)
Total Debt/Total Equity (Jensen, 1986 and Kim & Sorensen, 1986)
Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1999)
Number of years from the incorporation (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Han &
Suk, 1998)

b) Control Variable
Financial Leverage, measured as the ratio of debt to
capital employed, is included as a control variable in
the regression models because a firm’s capital
structure may influence its investment decisions and
the discretion afforded managers (Harris & Raviv,
1991).
Firm value will be included in the equation for
ownership concentration to deal with the potential
problem of reverse causality: it has been argued that
although ownership may affect performance,
ownership structure may also be affected by the firm
leverage. In line with Chen and Jaggi (2000), debt-toequity ratio (FLV) was used to measure firm leverage.
A company increases its leverage with the
intention of increasing its return on stockholder
equity. A 1.5 ratio indicates that the company is using
Rs. 1 in equity financing for each Rs. 1.50 in assets.
The ratio provides a direct relationship: the higher the
ratio, the higher the debt, or the lower the ratio, the
lower the debt. A ratio of one indicates that the
company has no debt.
In the existing empirical studies ownership
concentration tends to be negatively affected by firm

size (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Himmelberg et al.
1999). This result reflects probably wealth limitations
(it is simply more costly to acquire large portion of
equity in larger firms) and the concern with risk
diversification. But size is also sometimes considered
as a proxy for managerial discretion (Himmelberg et
al., 1999); in that case we expect size will positively
affect ownership concentration. Size may also be
viewed by potential shareholders as a proxy for
reputation. I measure size as the natural logarithm of
the firm’s assets.
6. Findings and Discussions
a)

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the
sample data. The highest mean value is for corporate
ownership that is 41.6%, the highest percentage of
corporate ownership is 98.9%, and the lowest
ownership representation is 0%. This is consistent
with the view that group ownership/corporate
ownership of listed companies in Pakistan is relatively
high. The highest director ownership in the sample
data is 90%, while 8% firms of the KSE-100 are
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directors dominating. Nevertheless, Bhabra (2007)
reports an average director ownership for her sample
of larger New Zealand firms was 9.34%, and Short
and Keasey (1999) report an average insider
ownership of 13% in their UK sample. Overall,
companies listed on the KSE-100 indexed companies
having higher director’s ownership compared to
companies in developed markets.
The mean of domestic public ownership is 17%
while institutional shareholding is 11%. This indicates
that a very high percentage of shares on the Karachi
stock market are owned by institutional investors and

general public. Foreign ownership highest is 84%
while the mean value is 9.9% that is 5 th largest form
of ownership in Pakistani companies. The market
based financial performance measure, Tobin’s Q, has
a mean of 1.034 that is comparable to developed
markets. However, the return on equity (ROE) and
return on assets (ROA) mean values are 0.13 and
0.069 respectively; which indicates that KSE listed
companies are not performing well. The control
variables, firm age, leverage and log of firm size are
also listed.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N = 475)
Individual Ownership (O_IND)
State Ownership (O_STA)
Institutional Ownership (O_INS)
Corporate Ownership (O_COR)
Director Ownership (O_DIR)
Foreign Ownership (O_FOR)
Other Type Ownership (O_OTH)
Director Dominate Firms (DOM_D)
Firm Age (F_Age)
Firm Size (F_Size)
Financial Leverage (FL)
Economic Value Added (EVA)
Return on Equity (ROE)
Return on Assets (ROA)
Tobin’s Q

b) Correlation Test
The influence of overall ownership structure on firm
performance has been studied in many markets. In
order to provide evidence on this aspect for Pakistan,
we first analyze the relationship between ownership
structure and firm performance. The correlation
matrix among ownership structure, firm performance
measures and other control variables is tabulated in
Table 3. It is worth notification that the four firm
performance variables are highly correlated each
other. This proves that the selection of these four
performance measures is reasonable since they test
the firm performance in same perspectives. The
results stated that high level of individual ownership
is negatively correlated with ROA, Tobin’s Q and
EVA. While, high level of state ownership in sample
companies is positively correlated with ROA, Tobin’s
Q and EVA. Both results are consistent with the all
three types of performance measurement.
The higher level of institutional ownership has
positive relationships with EVA and negative
correlation with Tobin’s Q.

Min
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5
5.112
0.00
0
-14.743
-0.876
0.047

Max
1.00
0.90
0.586
0.989
0.90
0.84
0.46
1.0
152
9.061
3.607
1
1.772
0.531
9.160

Mean
0.169
0.069
0.109
0.416
0.108
0.099
0.030
0.080
37.19
7.397
0.148
0.37
0.130
0.069
1.034

SD
0.176
0.194
0.107
0.315
0.205
0.150
0.080
0.272
26.68
0.703
0.268
0.484
0.792
0.135
1.095

The relationship between director’s dominating
organization and market based performance measure
(Tobin’s Q) is negative, which indicates that the
market performance of director dominating
companies is poor.
Results of Table 3 also reveals that firms with
higher level of director’s ownership has negative
impact on the economic performance of the company.
c) Regression Analysis
The R² value was 9.1%, 20.6% & 18.8%, this was
adjusted to 8.0%, 14% & 13.5% (R² adjusted)
respectively.
To conclude, the results from Table 4 shows that
a significant negative relationship exists between
ROE, Tobin’s Q and director dominated companies
and higher level of domestic public ownership
variables (p = 0.000, < 0.05). The higher level of
institutional ownership variable is significant for
ROA and Tobin’s Q with the F-statistics reported at
0.560, 2.942 and 2.455, Since prob.(F)<0.05, and
significant relationship exists between the variables.
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Table 3. Correlation Coefficient Analaysis (N = 475)
Variables
DIS_O
O_STA
O_COR
O_ISN
O_DIR
O_FOR
DOM_D
O_OTH
ROE
ROA
Tobin Q
EVA

O_IND
.756
(.000)
-.216
(.000)
-.461
(.000)
.119
(.009)
.029
(.525)
-.121
(.432)
-.023
(.614)
-.197
(.555)
-.002
(.971)
-.201
(.000)
-.170
(.000)
-.096
(.037)

O_STA O_COR

O_ISN

O_DIR

O_FOR

O_OTH

DOM_D

-.176
(.000)
.211
(.061)
-.165
(.000)
.098
(.074)
.063
(.174)
.060
(.191)
-.111
(.016)
.169
(.000)

-.112
(.090)
.844
(.000)
.033
(.100)
-.043
(.353)
-.083
(.073)
-.077
(.094)
-.102
(.027)

.111
(.019)
-.186
(.111)
.129
(.247)
.011
(.195)
.011
(.025)
.199
(.312)

.121
(.099)
-.900
(.070)
.089
(.120)
.344
(.200)
.132
(.333)

-.039
(.401)
-.052
(.262)
-.096
(.037)
-.039
(.402)

ROE

ROA Tobin’s Q

.
-.322
(.000)
-.145
(.002)
-.109
(.017)
-.200
(.322)
-.038
(.404)
.059
(.873)
.045
(.326)
.102
(.026)
.150
(.001)
.088
(.050)

-.163
(.000)
-.474
(.000)
.011
(.000)
-.388
(.000)
-.056
(.076)
-.047
(.310)
.071
(.125)
.054
(.241)
.000
(.993)

.323
(.000)
.120 .299
(.009) (.000)
.156 .348
(.001) (.000)

.195
(.000)

Table 4. Regression Analysis Results
Variables
O_IND
O_STA
O_INS
O_COR
O_DIR
O_FOR
O_OTH
DOM_D
R²
Adjusted R²
F-statistics
Prob. (F.stat)
Durbin-Watson

ROE
t-Value
(Prob.)
-.551
(.582)
-.746
(.456)
.392
(.695)
-1.392
(.165)
-.857
(.392)
0.982
(0.327)
.944
(.211)
-.018
(.006)
0.091
0.080
0.560
0.788
1.987

d) Hypotheses Justification
Hypothesis H1a: Associated company ownership has a
positive effect on firm performance.
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.165,
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.401, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (r=0.238,
p<0.05) and EVA (r=0.275, p<0.05). Correlation
results: ROE (β= 0.310, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.125,
p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (β= 0.241, p<0.05) and EVA (β =

ROA
t-Value
(Prob.)
-1.706
(.089)
-.982
(.326)
.688
(.009)
-.840
(.401)
-1.299
(.195)
1.733
(0.084)
-.721
(.544)
.605
(.545)
0.206
0.140
2.942
0.005
1.972

Tobin’s Q
t-Value
(Prob.)
-2.044
(.042)
-1.619
(.106)
2.966
(.003)
-1.182
(.238)
-.249
(.804)
2.424
(0.016)
.329
(.100)
0.857
(.392)
0.188
0.135
2.455
0.018
1.715

EVA
t-Value
(Prob.)
-1.788
(.074)
-1.175
(.241)
2.525
(.012)
-1.093
(.275)
-2.294
(.022)
1.121
(0.263)
1.100
(.201)
-2.056
(.040)
0.209
0.144
3.045
0.004
1.429

0.993, p<0.05). The relationship was not significant,
and hypothesis H1a was rejected.
Hypothesis H1b: Director’s ownership (insider
ownership) has a positive effect on firm performance.
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.392,
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.195, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (r=0.804,
p<0.05) and EVA (r=-0.022, p<0.05). Correlation
results: ROE (β= 0.353, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.173,
p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (β= 0.094, p<0.05) and EVA (β =
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-0.027, p<0.05). The relationship was not significant,
and hypothesis H1b was rejected.
Hypothesis H1c: Public Ownership has a positive
Effect on firm Performance.
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.582,
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.089, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (r=0.042, p<0.05) and EVA (r=-0.074, p<0.05).
Correlation results: ROE (β= 0.971, p<0.05), ROA
(β=-0.000, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (β= -0.000, p<0.05)
and EVA (β = -0.037, p<0.05). The relationship was
not significant, and hypothesis H1c was rejected.
Hypothesis H1d: Foreign Shareholding has a
positive effect on firm performance
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.327,
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.084, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (r=0.016,
p<0.05) and EVA (r=-0.263, p<0.05). Correlation
results: ROE (β= 0.247, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.195,
p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (β= 0.025, p<0.05) and EVA (β =
0.312, p<0.05). The relationship was significant, and
hypothesis H1d was accepted.
Hypothesis H1e: Government/State Shareholding
has a positive effect on firm performance
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.456,
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.326, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (r=0.106,
p<0.05) and EVA (r=0.241, p<0.05). Correlation
results: ROE (β= 0.326, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.026,
p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (β= 0.001, p<0.05) and EVA (β =
0.050, p<0.05). The relationship was significant, and
hypothesis H1e was accepted.
Hypothesis H1f: Institutional Shareholding has a
positive effect on firm performance
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.174,
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.191, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (r=0.016, p<0.05) and EVA (r=0.000, p<0.05).
Correlation results: ROE (β= 0.695, p<0.05), ROA
(β=0.009, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (β= 0.003, p<0.05) and
EVA (β = 0.012, p<0.05). The relationship was
significant, and hypothesis H1f was accepted.
Hypothesis
H1g:
Other
Categories
of
Shareholding has a positive effect on firm
performance
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.211,
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.544, p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (r=0.100,
p<0.05) and EVA (r=0.201, p<0.05). Correlation
results: ROE (β= 0.070, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.120,
p<0.05), Tobin’s Q (β= 0.200, p<0.05) and EVA (β =
-0.333, p<0.05). The relationship was not significant,
and hypothesis H1g was rejected.
7. Implications of the Findings
a) There is not any significant relationship between
Associate company/Corporate ownership and firm
performance. The monitoring and control school of
thought argues that the free-rider problems associated
with diffuse ownership, since the majority shareholder
captures most of the benefits associated with this
monitoring. Associated company ownership or
corporate ownership is the one of the largest
shareholding recipe of Pakistani listed companies but

this found out that this type of ownership does not
having any impact on the firm performance in
Pakistan. The results of the study have therefore,
shown there is dire need to reasonably diversify
shareholding as a way of attracting more skills and
competencies among the shareholders that can be
tapped to improve firm performance.
b) There is a negative relationship between
higher insider ownership and directors dominating
ownership on firm performance. It has been argued
that agency theory views managerial discretion as an
opportunity for managers to serve their own
objectives rather than the objectives of their
controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders
may develop various strategies to prevent managers
from using their decision making discretion to pursue
self-serving objectives at the expense of firm
performance. In fact, the study reaffirmed this
position among listed companies in Pakistan.
According to Chang and Wong (2003), strategic
management of managerial discretion is dependent, to
a large extent, on a comparison of the objectives of
controlling shareholders and those of managers.
Although it is now a well established fact that
managers may have self-serving objectives, there is
no priori that restricting managerial discretion will
better serve the goal of maximizing firm performance.
c) There is a negative relationship between
high public ownership and firm performance. The
global trend toward diffuse ownership has
confounded many researchers, since it undermines the
popular belief that executives are inherently selfseeking and can easily wreck the organization if left
without close monitoring. The findings have brought
a new dimension that emphasizes block shareholding
for creativity and innovation, and less monitoring by
shareholders. Thus, diffuse ownership of firms does
not provide environment for excellent policies to be
developed and implemented by managers due to the
Pakistani market structure with compare to the
developed economies. The managers are therefore
best informed regarding alternative uses for the
investors’ funds. As a result, the managers end up
with substantial residual control rights and discretion
to allocate funds as they choose which creates agency
issues. The downside of this argument is that it
presumes that managers are honest, and always
prepared to work in the objective interest of the
shareholders, a position that is often not true. The fact
that managers have most of the control rights can lead
to problems of management entrenchment and rent–
seeking behavior.
d) The positive and significant relationship
between foreign ownership and firm performance
appears to have gained universal acceptance across
the globe due to a number of factors. First, mostly
these foreign owned companies are from developed
countries and have access to management systems
whose efficacy has been tested in many contexts. The
massive resource base and bail-out plans for fledgling
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affiliates are other factors that enhance performance
of foreign owned firms. However, the ability of these
companies to re-organize their global operations to be
able to assign more costs to harsh tax regimes and
profits to tax havens in a bid to reduce their overall
tax liability, is the most damning feature of foreign
ownership.
e) There is a significant positive relationship
between
government
ownership
and
firm
performance. Government ownership has been
roundly criticized for contributing to generally poor
performance of firms, due to excessive bureaucracy,
tribalism, nepotism, poor human resource policies,
political expediency in appointments and lack of
respect for laws and regulations of the country. But
the current study has confirmed this long-held
position wrong. Most of the companies having strong
state/government ownership are having monopolistic
competition and enjoy the ultimate resources and
discretionary powers.
f) There is a positive relationship between
Institutional ownership and firm performance. Most
of previous studies have found positive significant
relationship between institutional ownership and firm
performance, due mainly to the differences in
investment preferences, professional management and
shareholders’ goals. Institutional investors manage
savings collectively on behalf of other investors
toward a specific objective in term of acceptable risk,
return maximization, and mature of claims (Davis,
2001). Institutional investors prefer to simply “vote
with their feet’s” and sell of poorly performing firms.
g) There is no significant relationship
between other ownership categories and firm
performance. The findings have brought that these
types of investment having live long relationships
with the company and there is not any practical
participation with the decision making process. Thus,
this diffuse ownership of firms purchase shares like
their saving and just care about the sustainability
instead of any other specific corporate goal related to
the performance of the company and they have
sufficient latitude for innovation and creativity, that
is, less monitoring by principals.
Conclusion
Using a panel of Pakistani listed firms during the
period 2007 to 2011, this study examines the affects
of ownership identity and director domination on firm
financial performance by using market based
performance measure, accounting based performance
measure and as well economic profit of the firms. The
results indicate a negative relationship of director
ownership and financial performance. Furthermore,
these findings suggest negative impact of associated
company ownership and performance, indicating
higher director ownership adverse effects on ROE and
EVA and misalignment of the interests of
management and owners. This study validate the

agency issue are placed in Pakistani listed companies
where the ownership structure and the firm’s
performance echo this.
The results of this study have important
implications for the ownership structure, insider’s
dominance and firm performance in Pakistan. It
confirms that the effect of director ownership on firm
performance is more negative where legal protection
for investors is weak. It suggests that although new
legislative reforms have been enacted, Pakistani
companies are highly dependent on internal
governance mechanisms. Due to high director/insider
ownership, managerial expropriation is very likely to
exist. There is potential merit in promulgating new
rules and regulations to control the expropriation of
minority shareholders.
The findings provide direction for further
research as to (i) what mechanisms are used by block
investors such as the government, financial
institutions and foreign investors in monitoring
managers and (ii) why some categories of investors
such as individuals, directors and corporate do not
contribute to the internal governance of firms even
though they invest a large amount of their wealth in
these companies.
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